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Common interest communities have
become more accessible since the founding
of Gramercy Park in Manhattan in 1831—
the first homeowner association, whose
members still enjoy exclusive use of the
2-acre green space they privately maintain.
Credit: © AA World Travel Library / Alamy (top),
Trust for Architectural Easements (bottom)
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with the CIC model and its governance, and
suggests approaches for enhancing the benefits
of common interest communities for both
property owners and society at large.

A New Yorker cartoon by Jack Ziegler captures
the essential irony of buying into condominiums,
cooperatives, and other homeowner associations.
A car is entering a driveway that leads to a group
of townhouses in the distance, and a sign by the
entrance proclaims, “Welcome to Condoville
and the Illusion of Owning Your Own Property”
(Ziegler 1984).
Despite this ambiguity, about a quarter of
the American population now lives in association
housing situations, collectively known as
common interest communities (CICs). Figure 1
shows the tremendous increase in CICs over
the past several decades. From 1970 to 2013,
the number of housing units in such communities
spiked from about 700,000 to 26.3 million, while
the number of residents multiplied more than
30-fold from 2.1 million to 65.7 million.
With their growing popularity, common
interest communities have raised policy challenges and legal issues that require ongoing
resolution. These conflicts generally reflect
either external concerns that CICs segregate
the wealthy from the rest of society or internal
disagreements between individual owners and
their associations’ governing bodies. This article
examines some of the controversies associated

The Rise of Common Interest
Communities
With increasing industrialization during the 19th
century, the intrusion of pollution, traffic, noise,
and disease led many planners and citizens to
favor the separation of residential, commercial,
and industrial uses. (Zoning had not yet emerged
as a planning tool and would not be validated by
the Supreme Court of the United States until
1926.) Some residential developers thus imposed
“servitudes”—covenants, restrictions, and
easements—on their subdivision projects.
Servitudes generally restricted the properties to
residential uses and often created shared rights
to communal facilities and services in exchange
for fees. Lot purchasers agreed to the servitudes,
and once the restrictions were recorded, subsequent purchasers were also legally bound. The
common law proved to be an effective vehicle for
creating high-end residential areas, including
New York City’s Gramercy Park (1831) and
Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844).
After a slowdown during the Great Depression
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and World War II, construction of CICs began to
boom in the late 1960s, after the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) recognized the condominium as an insurable ownership vehicle, and state
statutory authorization followed. FHA mortgage
insurance encouraged developers to build
middle-class condominiums, which gained
market acceptance as a result of the “new town”
movement—exemplified by early planned
communities such as Reston, Virginia (1964),
and Columbia, Maryland (1967). The passage of
California’s Proposition 13, the initiative that

A quarter of the American population now
lives in common interest communities.
limited property taxation in 1978, and similar
measures in other states also spurred an increase
in CICs, as cash-strapped local governments,
under increased pressure to provide more
services, were unwilling to absorb the infrastructure and service costs from new development.
As a result, they tended to approve new developments only in CIC form, where the developer
(and ultimately the owners) covered the costs.
Today, CIC owners are generally subject to a
variety of constraints related to their private
units, from limitations on the layout and design
of buildings and the type of construction
materials used, to restrictions on visible home
decorations, ancillary structures, and landscaping. There are often controls on the owner’s
behavior and use of the property, which is
typically limited to residential occupancy. Noise,
parking, and traffic rules may also be imposed,
along with vehicle restrictions. In some cases,
political signs, leafleting, and related activities
are also prohibited.
In exchange for their association dues,
owners have access to common facilities, such
as roads and recreational areas, and to private
services, such as security, trash collection, street
cleaning, and snow plowing. The CIC is usually
administered by a private residential government
and various committees, elected by the owners
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and subject to the law of contract rather than
public administrative and Constitutional law
(see Box 1).

Economic Benefits of CICs
CICs bring substantial economic benefits to
owners and to society at large. Residents who buy
into these communities have determined that
shared facilities, such as recreational areas, are a
better value than, say, personal swimming pools
and other private facilities. Similarly, those joining
CICs have determined that certain restrictions—
such as a prohibition on parking mobile homes in
driveways—increase property values.
These communities help to achieve efficient
use of land as well. The costs of organizing and
administering a private residential community
are lower than in a public system (Nelson 2009).
Transaction costs and rent-seeking through the
political system are also reduced. Finally,
because it is free from statutory and constitutional restraints, a private community has greater
flexibility in the substance of its rules and
operations, freeing it from adherence to public
guidelines when entering into contracts with
service providers and suppliers.
American courts have recognized these
efficiency benefits when enforcing CIC arrange-

Box 1

Common Interest Community Models
CICs typically create a private government
elected by the owners to administer and enforce
contracts, and to promulgate rules to advance
community interests. While the exact form of
the arrangement may vary, the basic concepts

ments and the owners’ reliance on them. As
one court noted, “It is a well-known fact that
[covenants] enhance the value of the subdivision
property and form an inducement for purchasers
to buy lots within the subdivision” (Gunnels v.
No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App,
17013 [1978]).

are similar.

Homeowner Associations
Unit owners hold fee title to their individual
properties, which are usually single-family or
townhouse homes. The association holds title to
common areas and grants the owners easement
rights for their use. These can be created by
common law or under statutes in some states.
Homeowner associations make up more than
half of community associations nationally.

Condominiums
Unit owners receive fee title to their units plus
a percentage ownership in the common areas.
The association administers the common areas
but does not hold title to them. Condominiums
may be vertical (high-rise) or horizontal (singlefamily or townhouse homes), and they are
created exclusively pursuant to state statute.
Condominiums represent 45 to 48 percent of
community associations.

Cooperatives
A cooperative corporation owns the building,
and the owners receive shares in the corporation
and automatically renewable, long-term leases
on their individual units. Unlike condominium
and homeowner associations, the corporation
can control transfer of leases and shares
by cooperative owners. Only 3 to 4 percent
of community associations are organized
as cooperatives.

External Concerns: Secession
from the General Community
Despite these benefits, various commentators
have argued that the services and private
facilities of CICs are available only to those who
can afford them and facilitate the separation of
the wealthy from the rest of society. The rest of
a CIC’s municipality is forced to do without,
creating a permanent, two-tier system of housing.
Critics also claim that privatization of infrastructure and services isolates CIC residents and
reduces their stake in broad communal issues.
By this logic, CIC dwellers are less willing to
engage with public government on civic matters
and more likely to resist tax increases, given that
the CIC rather than the municipal government
provides many services. Where community
associations are part of suburban developments,
isolation from the urban core may be acute.
These concerns often center on a fear of class
and economic segregation. As former Secretary
of Labor Robert Reich wrote in a New York Times
article called “Secession of the Successful”: In
many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect
withdrawn their dollars from the support of public
spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own private services. . . .
Condominiums and the omnipresent residential
communities dun their members to undertake
work that financially strapped local governments
can no longer afford to do well (Reich 1991).

Freedom of Choice

Middle-class condominiums gained market acceptance
in the 1960s, as a result of early planned communities
such as Reston, Virginia. Credit: BB_Image / iStock

This characterization of community associations,
however, is at odds with the fundamental
American values of freedom of contract and
freedom of association. It is a shared value that
people may spend their money for lawful
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purposes as they wish and enter into contracts
as they please. The law intrudes on freedom of
contract only in rare instances when major policy
considerations are at stake. Courts have recognized freedom of contract as an important
consideration for upholding private servitude
arrangements: We start with the proposition that
private persons, in the exercise of their constitutional right of freedom of contract, may impose
whatever restrictions upon the use of land which
they convey to another that they desire to impose
(Grubel v. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).

CIC owners pay property taxes at the
same rates as other citizens, even though
they privately purchase services such as
trash collection, street cleaning, and
security with their community association
dues. This amounts to double taxation.
CICs also reflect the American belief in
freedom of association, exemplified in a long
tradition of utopian communities and other
belief-centered networks. Residents in modern
CICs might share common interests, such as the
homeowners living in golf or equestrian communities. Other residents may simply share a desire
for neighborhood tranquility or character. In
Behind the Gates, Setha Low suggests that CICs
allow “middle-class families [to] imprint their
residential landscapes with ‘niceness,’ reflecting
their own aesthetic of orderliness, consistency,
and control” (Low 2004). Whatever the reason,
community associations are consistent with de
Tocqueville’s observation about American
interactions: Americans of all ages, all conditions,
and all dispositions, constantly form associations.
They have not only commercial and manufacturing
companies, in which all take part, but associations
of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral,
serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous
or diminutive (de Tocqueville 1835).
Moreover, the available evidence indicates
that CIC residents are generally happy with their
choice. In a 2014 survey conducted by Public
Opinion Strategies for the Community Associa-
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tions Institute, 64 percent of owners were positive
about their overall experience, and 26 percent
were neutral. While 86 percent of respondents
indicated that they wanted either less or no
additional governmental regulation, 70 percent
maintained that association rules and restrictions
protect and enhance property values.

The Issue of Double Taxation
While the rise of CICs reflects a variety of factors,
the constrained finances of municipalities
following the property tax revolts in the 1970s
were key. In fact, a different take on the “secession” narrative is that some owners in common
interest communities believe that municipal
government abandoned them.
CIC owners pay property taxes at the same
rates as other citizens, even though they
privately purchase services such as trash
collection, street cleaning, and security with their
community association dues. This amounts to
double taxation, charging association owners for
a service they are not receiving.
If a no-service policy were in effect before
an owner purchased a unit in a CIC, theoretically
the buyer could lower the offer price to reflect
the lack of municipal services and the double-taxation-effect. The unit owner would be
protected, and the developer would absorb the
loss. But if a municipality reduces services but
not taxes after the unit purchase, the owner
suffers an uncompensated loss. This outcome
would be bad policy in that it permits rent
seeking, allowing the majority of citizens in the
town to select one group of residents to bear an
extra tax burden even though they do not create
extra costs. This offends notions of both fairness
and efficiency, and it’s antithetical to community
building and civic trust.
It is especially important for legislatures to
avoid the use of double taxation as a matter of
policy, given that judicial challenges are unlikely
to succeed. The few courts that have entertained
attacks on double taxation have been unsympathetic to claims that it violates due process of
law, offends the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, or works a taking of property
without compensation. While double taxation may
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be bad policy, it is not unconstitutional. The courts
should not overturn such legislative decisions,
because these are essentially political outcomes
that the public should challenge at the ballot box.

The Question of Inequality
The “secession of the wealthy” argument appears
to be based on the notion that only higher-income
owners with higher-value homes live in common
interest communities. The available data,
however, do not clearly support this assumption.
As Figure 2 indicates, prices for condominiums
and cooperatives—half of the units in CICs
nationally—are below those for all existing
homes (including condominiums, cooperatives,
and single-family homes inside and outside of
community associations). While these estimates
are not deeply segmented (for example, they do
not break out single-family homes inside and
outside CICs), they do show that the values of
condominiums and cooperatives are consistent
with those of homes generally.
Housing affordability and access are significant challenges in the United States, but
community associations are not necessarily the
cause of these deep-seated, complex problems.
Employed before CICs became popular, exclusionary zoning imposed by local governments in
the form of large lot requirements has prevented
developers from building affordable housing.
CICs have in fact been found to lower the costs

of home purchases. Multi-unit housing, such
as condominiums and townhouses, is more
affordable than single-family homes because
it cuts the cost of land, infrastructure, and
building (Ellickson & Been 2005). Affordable
housing cooperatives permit restrictions on
resale prices and owner income, thus ensuring
that housing opportunities remain available for
lower-income families. For these purposes,
developers operating under city requirements
or incentives often designate condominium units
within a project as affordable units.

Affordable housing cooperatives permit
restrictions on resale prices and owner
income, thus ensuring that housing
opportunities remain available for lowerincome families.
It is therefore simplistic and counterproductive to see community associations as a battleground between rich and poor. Similarly,
pejorative use of the term “gated” communities
to describe those CICs with limited public access
does not advance understanding. Indeed, a
moderate-income cooperative with a front door
locked for basic security reasons falls within the
definition of a “gated” community.
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Guiding Principles
In what ways should the “secession of the
successful” critique affect our understanding,
acceptance, and authorization of common
interest communities? The issue is complex and
does not lend itself to binary choices. Instead,
it is a matter of accommodating competing
interests according to the following principles:
• Acceptance of the CIC model has increased
over time. These types of housing arrangements represent the free choice of many
people, and the law enforces their contracts
in most instances.
• CIC owners should relate to the municipal
government and the CIC structure under what
might be termed “augmented federalism.”
Under this notion, residents have additional
contractual duties to the CIC, but these
obligations do not excuse them from duties to
and participation in federal, state, and local
governments. In return, legislators should base
policy decisions affecting CIC owners on
considerations of fairness, efficiency, and
community building.

• Housing access and affordability require
comprehensive solutions. These issues should
be discussed and debated directly, and the
political process should determine the course
of action. Viewing these issues only as a CIC
problem is unwarranted and will not bring
effective results.

Internal Conflicts: Individual
Owners vs. the Community
In his groundbreaking book Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments (1996), Evan McKenzie warned
that: CICs feature a form of private government
that takes an American preference for private
home ownership and, too often, turns it into an
ideology of hostile privatism. Preservation of
property values is the highest social goal, to which
other aspects of community life are subordinated.
Rigid, intrusive, and often petty rule enforcement
makes a caricature of . . . benign management,
and the belief in rational planning is distorted into

Box 2

Conflicts Make Good Copy
While the following headlines fail to represent the

• “Dallas Man Suing Rabbi Neighbor Who Uses House

myriad positive interactions between individual

as a Synagogue.” The plaintiff claimed that the use

owners and associations, they do suggest some of the

of the home for a 25-person congregation violated

difficult interactions that can occur.

the residential restriction (KDFW Fox4 Online,

• “Marine’s Parents Sued Over Sign of Support in
Their Bossier City [La.] Front Yard.” The 3 ft. x 6 ft.
sign displayed a picture of their son in uniform,
before deployment to Afghanistan, with text that
read, “Our son defends our freedom” (Associated
Press, July 25, 2011).
• “Bucks County Woman Fined by Homeowners’
Association For Colored Christmas Lights.”
Association members had previously voted in favor
of permitting white lights only (CBS Philly,
December 2, 2011).

February 4, 2014).
• “A Grandfather Is Doing Time For Ignoring A Judge’s
Order in a Dispute Over Resodding His Yard.” The
association won a judgment of $795 against the
owner who claimed that he could not afford to
resod his browning lawn. When the owner failed to
pay, the court jailed him for contempt (St. Petersburg Times, October 10, 2008).
• “Hilton Head Plantation Resident Disputes Gate
Toll for Unpaid Fees.” An owner brought suit after an
association imposed a $10 entrance gate fee on
homeowners delinquent on their annual association dues (Island Packet, August 29, 2014).
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an emphasis on conformity for its own sake.
Conflicts between residents and CIC associations or boards often revolve around two general
issues: the substance of the restrictions and the
procedures for enforcement (see Box 2). As Figure
3 shows, disputes may focus on a range of topics,
from landscaping restrictions to assessment
collection. Indeed, 24 percent of CIC residents
responding to the 2014 Public Opinion Strategies
survey had experienced a significant personal
issue or disagreement with their associations.
Of this group, 52 percent were satisfied with the
outcome and 36 percent were dissatisfied; in 12
percent of cases, the issue was still unresolved.
There are indeed certain risks that community
associations can overstep with respect to the
substance and enforcement of restrictions, but
legislation and judicial supervision can address
these substantive and procedural policy concerns.

Freedom of Choice
As discussed earlier, individuals exercise their
freedom of choice by purchasing homes in CICs
and agreeing to be subject to their rules. Associa-

tion living may not be for everyone, but the
expectation of people who choose the CIC life
should generally be respected and not be
frustrated by someone who subsequently seeks
to violate the compact. The courts generally
reflect this view, as suggested by this 1981 ruling:
[The original] restrictions are clothed with a very
strong presumption of validity which arises from
the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing and accepting the restrictions
to be imposed. . . . [A] use restriction in a declaration of condominium may have a certain degree of
unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack
in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner
could not rely on the restrictions found in the
declaration . . . since such restrictions would be in
a potential condition of continuous flux (Hidden
Harbour Estates v. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).
There are several scenarios, though, where
homeowners may have no freedom of choice.
First, it is possible that the only new housing
available to buyers would be in CICs—i.e.,
developers are no longer building new homes
outside of associations. Indeed, a recent report

FIGURE 3
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found that in 2003, 80 percent of all homes being
built at that time were in associations (Foundation for Community Association Research 2014).
In addition, municipal government may require
developers to create associations as a condition
for subdivision approval. (Recent legislation in
Arizona prohibiting this practice indicates that it
still occurs.) Finally, some courts have suggested
that while rules in place at the time of purchase
should be enforced, a rule subsequently enacted

Association restrictions raise concerns when
they threaten the personal autonomy and
fundamental individual rights of owners.
by the association or board under a reserved
power should not be enforced if an owner can
show that it is “unreasonable.” Other courts
disagree: Homeowner should not be heard to
complain when, as anticipated by the recorded
declaration of covenants, the homeowners’
association amends the declaration. When a
purchaser buys into such a community, the
purchaser buys not only subject to the express
covenants in the declaration, but also subject
to the amendment provisions. . . . And, of course,
a potential homeowner concerned about community association governance has the option to
purchase a home not subject to association
governance. . . . For this reason, we decline to
subject the amendments . . . to the “reasonableness” test (Hughes v. New Life Development
Corp., Tenn. Sup. Ct. [2012]).

Guidelines for Protecting
Personal Autonomy
Association restrictions raise concerns when they
threaten the personal autonomy and fundamental
individual rights of owners. Constraints of this
type might include prohibitions of political signs
or messaging, and restriction of occupancy to
“traditional” families.
Courts should enforce restrictions if they
limit spillovers (also known as fallout or external-
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ities) from one owner to the rest of the community. They should not, however, enforce restrictions
that limit the nature or status of the occupants
or the behavior within a unit that does not create
externalities. This approach is based on the
theory that the primary purpose of CIC regimes
is to enhance economic value and encourage
efficient exchanges. Thus, if the owner creates
no externalities, the courts should not enforce
bans on the particular behavior. Moreover, some
values of personal autonomy are too important
and trump the usual rules of contract. We do not,
for example, permit contracts of indentured
servitude or the sale of human organs.
By this standard, limiting noise and banning
smoking (because of seepage of odors) in
multi-family units would be legitimate, but
restrictions based on the marital status of
residents would not. Some situations are
trickier—for example, restrictions on pets. Under
the suggested guidelines, it would usually be
legitimate to bar pets because of the potential
noise and the reluctance of some residents to
share common areas with them. In the case of
service animals, however, the unit owner’s health
needs may trump community concerns.
First Amendment–type issues present
special challenges. Free expression—such as
political or issue-related signage, leafleting,
demonstrations, or other manifestations—can
cause spillovers that may include noise, aesthetic
interference, and disruption of the community’s
general ambience. At the same time, however, free
speech is fundamental to our republican form of
government, arguably whether it is addressed to
the larger public government or the private
government. In expression cases, courts might
apply the longstanding doctrine that prohibits
covenants that violate public policy, rejecting
total bans on speech in favor of reasonable
restrictions on time, place, and manner. This
would allow expression but limit, if not eliminate,
spillover on the community.
Religious freedom is another fundamental
American value. Restrictions on the placement
of a mezuzah on doorposts and the display of
crèches, statues of saints, and Christmas lights
limit free exercise of religion. While it would open

a Pandora’s box to engage in balancing the
religious importance of colored versus white
Christmas lights against CIC standards, it would
nevertheless be appropriate for the courts to
impose a general standard of reasonable
accommodation on CIC regulations that affect
religious practices.
Finally, in the development and enforcement
of association rules, CIC property owners have a
right to expect certain behavior from associations and boards. This expectation traces from
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that
is incumbent on all parties to a contract. Thus,
an owner should have a right to fair procedures,
including notice and an opportunity to be heard;
to be treated equally to other similarly situated
owners; and to be free from bias, personal
animus, and bad-faith decision making by the
board and its members.

Conclusion
Common interest communities are a large part
of the American residential landscape, currently
providing homes for a quarter of the U.S.
population. While CICs bring great economic
advantages to residents and society in general,
these types of housing arrangements do require
nuanced interactions between the community
association and the municipal government, and
association rules can impinge on the personal
autonomy of members. However, strategies are
available to mitigate if not overcome these
problems. Indeed, these approaches can make
ownership of a home in a CIC less of an illusion
and more of a reality.
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